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Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan during the past six years have proven that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will be a major focus of the Marine Corps' future planning and training. In the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025, General James Conway states:
Our Corps must serve credibly as a persistently engaged and multicapable force, able to draw upon contributions from our Total Force, in order to address the full range of contingencies the future will undoubtedly present. In short, we must be prepared to move with speed, "live hard,"
and accomplish any mission. In COIN operations, logisticians must provide support through a careful mix of supply based or supply point practices with distribution based on unit distribution 2 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency (Washington, D.C., 2006), 8-3. 3 FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, 8-5. methods. Situations can swiftly develop that require equally rapid logistic responses to prevent further deterioration of security conditions. 4 To give the web flexibility, logisticians must ensure a balance between efficient dispersion of assets and maintaining a reserve capability to react to immediate demands. Often, those immediate demands are given at the direction of the battalion commander. In many cases, it is the commander's logistical capability that becomes the "tip of the spear." MCWP 3-33.5 explains:
In COIN, the support provided by sustainment units often extends beyond sustaining operations; support provided to the population may become an important shaping operation or even the decisive operation.
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The bottom line is: if the logistical web is not built to withstand rapid redirection of personnel and assets, the counterinsurgent Marine's mission will fail.
The Current Construct and Its Problems
In the current organization of Marine Corps logistics equipment and personnel, tactical control of medium lift assets, such as Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVR), is maintained at too high a level to be effective in the COIN environment. According to its By consolidating the common requirements, the frame work for the enhanced logistics section is established (See Figures 1 and 2 In the same article, he lists the equipment that he distributed to each subordinate element and states how these capability sets, when resident with the battalion FOBs, eliminated sourcing and the "last tactical mile" distribution requirements placed on the RCT and CLB.
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He further states, "With these additional assets, the battalion was well equipped to quickly respond to the needs of its subordinates." 13 Each of these statements clearly reinforce the requirement for establishing a permanent medium lift capability at the battalion level. And finally, being a permanent part of the unit would allow for adequate training and standardization of skill sets for each vehicle operator and mechanic. Ultimately, the enhanced logistics section model presents the commander with options that have direct impact on his ability to achieve success in the COIN fight.
Counterarguments and Rebuttals
Critics argue that if an infantry battalion 
Conclusion
The ability of a Marine Corps infantry battalion commander to sustain influence within his battle space is directly proportional to the unit's organic logistics capability. In 
